Auguste Comte is the central figure in the history of social thought, just as Darwin is the central figure in biological thought. A greater than Comte may arise, but none has arisen as yet; for Comte did for science what Jesus did for religion—he socialized it. This does not mean that Jesus did not have many precursors, nor that Comte did not have many. Nor does it mean that Jesus was successful in converting the religious world to his point of view; or that Comte was successful in converting the scientific world to his point of view. Probably four out of five scientific men, even today, would deny, or denounce, the idea of humanizing and socializing science. But here the parallelism between Comte and Jesus of Nazareth stops, for Jesus had a personality that was remarkably in harmony with his teaching. He was, himself, the embodiment of all that he taught men to be or to do. Comte, on the other hand, had many intellectual and moral faults. He was a petty individual in many ways, and an unsocialized, disgruntled individual in other ways.
Comte divided sociology into statics and dynamics. The “statical” aspect of sociology is similar to what we would call structure today, while the “dynamical” aspect refers to change. Statical sociology rests upon the philosophical assumption that society is an organism united by consensus, for “there must always be a spontaneous harmony between the whole and the parts of the social system.” (Comte 461). The study of dynamics is actually more interesting, but we must “contemplate order, that we may perfect it.”(Comte 461).
Dynamical sociology is the study of the sequence of man’s development, and each step in that sequence is the necessary consequence of the preceding step. As Leibniz argued, “the present is big with the future.” (Comte 464). Social science, therefore, has as its task the discovery of the laws that govern the sequence. The discovery of those laws, in turn, provides a rational basis for facilitating the progress of mankind.
One factor that helps us discover the laws of development is their universality. That is, the laws apply to all societies, so that one could study the most advanced of societies and learn about the sequence through which all must pass. For Comte, one of the most advanced societies was his own–the past development and the future direction of France was the model which would apply to all societies.
In his search for the laws of historical sequence, Comte identified three stages of historical development (which corresponded to three stages of development in the human mind). Thus, he posited a “fundamental law” of the development of human intelligence, namely, that it 41 passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive.” (Comte 25). These three stages are both three successive methods of intellectual functioning and three corresponding types of social orders.
In the theological state, intellectual functioning “supposes all phenomena to be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings.” (Comte 26). Comte subdivided the theological state, however, into three stages: fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism. The stage of fetishism marked the beginning of the theological era of mankind; in this stage, man “conceives of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own, with differences of mere intensity.” (Comte 545). Comte goes into great detail in showing how this mode of thinking (and all the modes) relate to the social order. In the stage of fetishism, for example, society was characterized by sacerdotal authority, by the beginning of the conquest of nature, and by behavior based more on affect than on the intellect. The family unit emerged, along with a permanence of residence that facilitated the subsequent development of the state.
During the polytheistic period, the city emerged, landed property became a social institution, the caste system appeared, and war was waged as “the only means of rendering the political organism durable and progressive.” (Comte 574). Finally, in the period of monotheism, a modification of the theological and military character of the theological state began to take place. The Catholic church failed to provide a viable basis for social life. Women and laborers were emancipated. Church and state were ruptured by the universal claims of the church and the local nature of political power. And war shifted from aggressive to defensive action.
Many of the changes and developments of the theological period were a preparation for the Positive era of humanity. The worship of Mary, for example, paved the way for the worship of humanity. A transitional period–the metaphysical era–was still necessary, however.
The metaphysical state is a modification of the first, the theological, state; the assumption of the mind is not the existence of supernatural beings but of “abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena.” (Comte 26). Nature, rather than God, becomes the basic causal factor of the universe. And natural, abstract laws, rather than divine laws, become the explanatory tools.
In the social order corresponding to this mode of thinking, the theological philosophy and military polity finally reach their “decline and dissolution . . . in preparation for a new and permanent organic state Of Society” (Comte 26). Comte spoke of the analysis of this period as an “irksome task”; the more pleasant task was the consideration of the emerging Positive state.
In the Positive state, then, the human mind no longer searches for “absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena”; instead, it looks for the laws governing phenomena, “that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance.” (Comte 637). Reasoning and observation become the tools of the intellect. The social order which will ultimately emerge from this mode of thinking will be an ideal state in which material, intellectual, and moral factors will be properly combined for the maximum well-being of man.
In the Positive state, the Religion of Humanity will emerge. Sociologists will be the priests of the new religion, and will guide man in his harmonious existence. The priest-sociologists will teach man to think positively (i.e., scientifically) and will relate the doctrines of love, order, and progress to man. Military power will be replaced by industrial power, and men will live harmoniously together as their behavior and social institutions are shaped and directed by their Positive mode of thought.
It is obvious, then, that Comte viewed change in terms of progress. Moreover, he saw progress as occurring in every facet of the social order, including the physical, ethical, intellectual, and political realms. Such progress is tied up with scientific development; the latest and most complex of sciences–sociology-will enable man to attain the ideal social order. The disorder of his own day, according to Comte, was rooted in the simultaneous existence of the three incompatible philosophies–theological, metaphysical, and Positive. Any of the three can create a social order, but their coexistence precludes any sort of order. It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain which of the philosophies must ultimately prevail, and once this is ascertained, “every man, whatever may have been his former views, can not but concur in its triumph.” (Comte 26). It is the task of sociology to show the inevitable triumph of the Positive philosophy, and to teach men to accept and utilize it to create the new order.
Comte declared that men are not equal. Although recognizing the utility of the dogma of equality in breaking up old political systems, he was persuaded that this dogma is an obstacle to an effective reorganization of society.
“Since the abolition of slavery, there has been no denial, from any quarter, of the right of every man (innocent of strong anti-social conduct) to expect from all others the fulfilment of the conditions necessary to the natural development of his personal activity, suitably directed; but beyond that undisputed right, men cannot be made, because they are not, equal, nor even equivalent; and they cannot therefore possess, in a state of association, any identical rights beyond the great original one. The simple physical inequalities which fix the attention of superficial observers are much less marked than intellectual and moral differences; and the progress of civilization tends to increase these more important differences, as much as to lessen the inferior kind; and, applied to any assemblage of persons thus developed, the dogma of equality becomes anarchical, and directly hostile to its original destination.” (Bruhl-Levy 130).
Comte blamed this dogma for that false claim to liberty of conscience which induces men, regardless of their competence, to express opinions on all matters whatever. “There is no liberty of conscience,” he says, “in astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in physiology, in the sense that everyone would think it absurd not to accept in confidence the principles established in those sciences by competent persons. If it is otherwise in politics, the reason is merely because, the old doctrines having gone by and the new ones not being yet formed, there are not properly, during the interval, any established opinions.” (Bruhl-Levy 14). Although Mill confessed to some lack of sympathy with Comte on this point, he summarized Comte’s views well:
. . . when every man is encouraged to believe himself a competent judge of the most difficult social questions, he cannot be prevented from thinking himself competent also to the most important public duties, and the baneful competition for power and official functions spreads constantly downwards to a lower and lower grade of intelligence. In M. Comte’s opinion, the peculiarly complicated nature of sociological studies, and the great amount of previous knowledge and intellectual discipline requisite for them, together with the serious consequences that may be produced by even temporary errors on such subjects, render it necessary, in the case of ethics and politics, still more than of mathematics and physics, that whatever legal liberty may exist of questioning and discussing, the opinions of mankind should really be formed for them by an exceedingly small number of minds of the highest class, trained to the task by the most thorough and laborious mental preparation; and that the questioning of their conclusions by any one not of an equivalent grade of intellect and instruction, should be accounted equally presumptuous, and more blamable, than the attempts occasionally made by sociologists to refute the Newtonian astronomy (Mill 69).
In sum, Comte made a number of contributions to sociology in general and to the study of social change in particular. Among the more important of the latter were his recognitions that change is normal, that the problem for sociological investigation is to identify those factors that affect the rate of change, and that sociologists must be involved in using their knowledge to shape the future of mankind. Comte’s answer was that sociological knowledge will be used to further the progress of society, and the sociologist will be the vehicle through which the knowledge will become effective.
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